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A note on time discretion and the welfare cost of lump-sum taxation 
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The lump-sum tax is broadly regarded by standard optimal tax theory as the 
only non-distortionary tax instrument; any other tax instrument distorts 
relative prices and thus creates a deadweight loss. This paper discusses an 
unintended effect of lump-sum taxation that can be considered a distortion 
of the time endowment. Whenever this tax exceeds the amount of non-labor 
income, it reduces the taxpayer’s ability to freely allocate her time 
endowment. As long as the taxpayer assigns a positive value to time 
discretion, then the lump-sum tax creates a welfare cost that has not been 
identified in the literature. The welfare cost of the lump-sum tax could 
plausibly be greater than the traditional measure of deadweight loss of an 
equal yield labor income tax, which does not affect time discretion. Since 
the lump-sum tax does not unambiguously lead to a greater welfare level, 
we can conclude that it is not a proper efficiency standard at low levels of 
non-labor income. The same argument can be used to call for caution in the 
use of taxes based on the value of assets that are not the source of income 
flows, like owner-occupied property taxes and some types of wealth taxes. 
At low levels of non-labor income, these tax instruments will also have a 
negative effect on time discretion. 
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Lump-sum taxation is widely considered in standard optimal tax theory as the only efficient or 
non-distortionary tax instrument. In order to collect a given amount of revenue, any other tax 
reduces taxpayer’s welfare more than the lump-sum tax, imposing a deadweight loss to society. 1 
This paper argues that when the lump-sum tax exceeds the amount of non-labor income, it becomes 
a tax on the time endowment, or a time tax, because the taxpayer is forced to work a certain period 
of time without pay. This effect of lump-sum taxation can be interpreted as a loss of taxpayer 
discretion over her time endowment, and can even be considered as a form of forced or compulsory 
labor. 2  
  This short paper compares the effects of the lump-sum tax on taxpayer’s time discretion 
with the effects of the labor income tax, which does not impose restrictions on the time endowment. 
In the presence of time discretion losses, the welfare cost of the lump-sum tax may well exceed 
the distortions imposed by other tax instruments. In this context, the choice between lump-sum 
and labor income taxation is decided by comparing two types of distortion, and the lump-sum tax 
cannot be regarded as proper standard of efficiency.  
  Time discretion losses can also be caused by taxes on the value of assets that are not the 
source of income flows, like owner-occupied property taxes and other forms of wealth taxes. At 
low levels of non-labor income, these tax instruments will also have a negative effect on tax 
                                                           
1 For an overview of standard optimal taxation theory see, for instance, Auerbach and Hines (2002). 
2 The Forced Labour Convention of 1930 defines forced or compulsory labor in its Article 2 as “all work or service 
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered 
himself voluntarily.” Assuming that tax compliance is enforced and that the taxpayer would not offer herself 
voluntarily to work in any job without pay, then the definition describes the case analyzed in this paper. The same 
Convention excludes from this definition “any work or service which forms part of the normal civic obligations of 
the citizens of a fully self-governing country” as well as other types of work and services; however, we may argue 
that labor provided exclusively to pay a tax cannot be considered as a “normal civic obligation.” This Convention 




discretion, becoming a time tax. Moreover, provided that a lower level of non-labor income is 
associated with greater discretion losses, time taxes can be expected to be regressive. 3 The net 
welfare cost of time discretion losses may help explain the unpopularity of the lump-sum tax and 
other taxes with similar effects on the time endowment. 4  
 
2. On the value of time discretion 
The lump-sum tax is considered as non-distortionary by definition, because it does not depend on 
taxpayer’s behavior. Any given amount of revenue collected through a distortionary tax can also 
be collected as a lump-sum tax without distorting relative prices. The lump-sum tax, however, has 
an unintended consequence that has not been described in the literature. When it is greater than 
non-labor income, the taxpayer is forced to work to pay the tax, and thus her time discretion is 
reduced.  
  The reduction of time discretion is described in Figure 1, where non-labor income is for 
simplicity assumed to be zero. Taxpayer’s income 𝑦 increases upward in the vertical axis; leisure 
𝜌 increases rightward in the horizontal axis, where 𝜅 represents the time endowment. The initial 
budget constraint is the line connecting 𝑎 and 𝜅. A loss of time discretion means that that the 
taxpayer is no longer able to freely allocate her time endowment between leisure and labor. 
                                                           
3 The negative welfare effects of time taxes can be especially acute if individuals are already time-poor. Vickery 
(1977) defines time-poverty as spending too much time in market work and too little in nonmarket work. A small 
but growing body of literature emphasizes the time dimension of wellbeing, and suggests that the income-poor have 
limited access to market goods that save household production time (Antonopoulos, Masterson and Zacharias 2012) 
and have access to a lower quality of leisure (Merz and Rathjen 2014). 
4 Lump-sum tax and wealth taxes have for long been recognized as unpopular in the literature. For instance, the 
discontent produced by the implementation of a lump-sum tax in the United Kingdom is considered one of the 
factors leading to Margaret Thatcher’s resignation as Prime Minister in 1990 (Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009). 




Graphically, this loss is shown by a movement of the intercept of the budget constraint with the 
horizontal axis to the left of 𝜅, such that 𝜌 = 𝜅 is not feasible anymore. Without non-labor income, 
a lump-sum tax 𝑠 reduces time discretion in 𝑠 𝑤⁄  units of time, where 𝑤 denotes the wage rate.  
  Standard optimal taxation theory pays no attention to the effect of lump-sum taxation on 
the time endowment, and consequently assumes (implicitly) that the loss of time discretion has no 
effect on taxpayer’s welfare. In this framework lump-sum taxation imposes a welfare cost lower 
than any other tax instrument. Figure 1 compares the welfare effects of lump-sum and labor income 
taxes. The initial equilibrium is at 𝑒0, where the budget constraint is tangent to the indifference 
curve 𝑢0. A labor income tax rate 𝑡 reduces the wage rate from 𝑤0 to 𝑤1 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑤0, rotating 
the budget constraint over 𝜅 without affecting time discretion. The new optimum under 𝑡 is at 𝑢1, 
and tax revenue 𝑅 is equal to the vertical difference between the equilibrium point 𝑒1 and the 
original budget constraint. The labor income tax is considered inefficient because an equal yield 
lump-sum tax 𝑠 = 𝑅 allows the taxpayer to reach a higher level of utility 𝑢2. Using the expenditure 
function 𝐸(𝑤0, 𝑢𝑖) to represent the minimum expenditure required to reach the utility level 𝑢𝑖 with 
the wage rate 𝑤0, the equivalent variation measure of the deadweight loss of the labor income tax 
is 𝐷𝑊𝐿 = 𝐸(𝑤0, 𝑢0) − 𝐸(𝑤0, 𝑢1) − 𝑅. 
  The relative benefit of lump-sum taxation has been obtained in this case at the expense of 
a loss of time discretion equal to 𝜅 − 𝜋. Standard economic theory is silent about the welfare value 
of time discretion, but it implicitly assumes that the value of each unit of time discretion lost is 
equal to the wage rate, the opportunity cost of leisure. This implies that the monetary value of 𝜅 −
𝜋 is equal to (𝜅 − 𝜋)𝑤0 = 𝑠, the intended tax burden. The problem with this approach, however, 
is that the reduction of income and the reduction of time discretion are different in nature. While 
lower income means that some baskets of goods and services are no longer affordable, lower time 
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discretion implies that, in addition, the taxpayer has lost part of her ability to freely allocate her 
time endowment. The value of 𝜅 − 𝜋 is simply not meant to be captured by the standard time 
allocation model. Indeed, according to the latter the taxpayer could (quite literally) be slaved by 
means of the lump-sum tax without increasing the welfare costs above the amount of the tax itself.  
 
Figure 1: Welfare effects of lump-sum and labor income taxes 
 
 The effective value of time discretion depends on the uncertainty faced by the taxpayer 
between the implementation of tax policy and the completion of the time allocation decision. To 
illustrate this point, consider two alternative tax schedules. Schedule 1 is a 20 percent tax rate on 
the wage rate, under which the taxpayer will choose to work six hours per day from Monday to 
Friday. Under schedule 2, equivalent to an equal yield lump-sum tax, there is no proportional 
reduction in the wage rate, but the first six eight hours of labor supplied on Monday are unpaid. 5 
                                                           
















As long as preferences are convex, standard optimal taxation theory predicts that the taxpayer 
would invariably be better off under the second alternative. But in order for this conclusion to be 
correct, the lump-sum tax must be set before point 𝑒1 has been reached, otherwise there would be 
no time left to allocate and 𝑒2 would no longer be feasible. The implementation of the lump-sum 
tax must take place before the time allocation decision is made, when the taxpayer is not certain 
about how much time she will be able and willing to work during the week. Different possible 
scenarios to be realized before or during the week (e.g. sickness, family emergencies, etc.) may 
also affect taxpayer’s time discretion and consequently change her optimal labor decision and 
utility level. Let each of the 𝑁 possible levels of time discretion be associated with a probability 
𝑝𝑛, where 𝑛 = 1,… , 𝑁. Both the optimal labor decisions as well as the corresponding levels of 
utility under the lump-sum tax (𝑢𝑛
𝑠) and under the labor income tax (𝑢𝑛
𝑡 ) can be expected to be 
different at each level of time discretion. In this context, it is not necessarily the case that the 
expected utility under the lump-sum tax, ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑢𝑛
𝑠𝑁
𝑛=1 , is greater than the expected utility under the 
labor income tax, ∑ 𝑝𝑛𝑢𝑛
𝑡𝑁
𝑛=1 , or that the 𝐷𝑊𝐿 of the labor income tax (as computed by the 
standard theory) is greater than its expected utility gains with respect to the lump-sum tax. 6 
 
3. Conclusion 
When a lump-sum tax exceeds the amount of non-labor income, time discretion is reduced and the 
taxpayer is forced to work without pay. The associated welfare cost is are not accounted for by 
standard optimal taxation theory, implying that the deadweight loss of taxes other than lump-sum 
                                                           
6 A more complete account of the welfare effects of these taxes may include the taxpayer’s attitude toward risk and 
the value of eliminating uncertainty with the use of insurance, but they are not considered here because would add 
nonessential complications to the main argument presented in this short paper.  
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can be overestimated.  In particular, labor income taxation allows the taxpayer to enjoy full 
discretion over the available tax endowment. If the welfare gains from full time discretion are 
equal or greater than the traditional measure of deadweight loss, we can conclude that the labor 
income tax is not distortionary. It follows that at low levels of non-labor income the lump-sum tax 
may not be a proper standard of efficiency for the design of tax policy reform; and that other taxes 
that affect time discretion, like those based on the value of assets that generate no explicit income, 
create welfare costs that are underestimated by the standard theory of optimal taxation. 
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